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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Having concluded that section 315 conferred immunity, the ma-
jority held that state libel laws have been pre-empted insofar as they
might conflict with that immunity:
We have not hesitated to abrogate state law where satisfied that its
enforcement would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Here peti-
tioner is asking us to attribute to section 315 a meaning which would
either frustrate the underlying purposes for which it was enacted, or
alternatively impose unreasonable burdens on the parties governed by
that legislation.'"
It is upon the issue of pre-emption that Mr. Justice Frankfurter most
strongly dissented. He argued that Congress has not expressly con-
ferred immunity upon broadcasters under section 315, and that in the
absence of a clear pronouncement, there is not sufficient conflict be-
tween state and federal law to warrant the abrogation of state libel
laws in this area.
The obvious conflict which results when both the federal and
state governments attempt to regulate identical subjects does not
manifest itself here ;17 but, it is certainly an example of state law in-
terfering with the accomplishment of valid Congressional objectives.'
That the power over interstate commerce includes the right to regu-
late broadcasting is well established. "' That Congress, in the exer-
cise of that power, could grant immunity to broadcasters is not de-
nied. The clear conflict between state libel laws and the policy of
section 315 necessitated a determination that the libel laws had been
pre-empted. In making this determination, the Court has acted rea-
sonably in view of the legislative history and the clearly announced
purpose of section 315.
GERALD A. MESSERMAN
TAXATION - A NEW ERA IN TAXING INTERSTATE INCOME
Northwestern States Portland Cement Company v. State of Min-
nesota came to the Supreme Court of the United States' on appeal
from the Supreme Court of Minnesota,2 which court had upheld the
assessment by the State of Minnesota of income taxes for the years
1933-1948 against appellant, an Iowa corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of cement, with its plant in Mason City, Iowa."
16. 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959).
17. For the classic example of this type of conflict, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824).
18. See Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
19. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Federal Radio Com-
mission v. Nelson, 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
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Appellant's business in Minnesota consisted of the regular and
systematic solicitation of orders for the sale of its products, each
order being subject to acceptance, filling, and delivery from the plant
in Mason City. Appellant leased a sales office in Minneapolis, Min-
nesota, which was under the supervision of a manager who performed
sales functions. A salesman and a secretary also occupied the three-
room office. Two additional salesmen used it as a clearing house.
No bank account was kept in Minnesota by appellant, no real estate
was owned there, nor was any merchandise warehoused there. Fur-
ther, all sales were made on a delivered price basis from appellant's
plant in Mason City, and all orders taken in Minnesota were trans-
mitted daily to Mason City for approval and acknowledgement,
which was forwarded directly to the purchaser.
Because no income tax returns were filed with the state by the
appellant, assessments, aggregating some $102,000, were made by
the commissioner of taxation. The Supreme Court of the United
States said, in affirming this assessment:
... net income from exclusively interstate operations of a foreign cor-
poration may be subjected to state taxation, provided the levy is not
discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the
taxing state forming sufficient nexus to support the same 4 (Emphasis
added.)
Mr. Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion of the Court, de-
scribed the setting for this momentous decision as one which has
grown up because of Congress' failure to regulate taxation of inter-
state commerce and because of the states' persistent desire to get
some measure of return for the benefits they have afforded such com-
merce. Further, he noted that the judicial application of constitu-
tional principles to specific state statutes in this area allowed much
room for controversy, and that this Court alone has handed down
some three hundred opinions on the subject.
The Court, in the majority opinion, after an examination of sev-
eral of the earlier cases on the particular subject presented, came to
the conclusion that it has consistently upheld state net income taxes
of general application which were applied so as to reach that portion
of the profits of interstate business enterprises fairly allocable to
activities within the state's borders, and that they were doing no more
1. 358 U.S. 450 (1959), decided with Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., on
certiorari from the Supreme Court of Georgia, 213 Ga. 713, 101 S.E.2d 197 (1957), because
of the similiarity of facts and issues involved.
2. 250 Minn. 32, 84 N.W.2d 373 (1957).
3. This tax was levied under section 290.03 of the Minnesota statutes, which imposes an an-
nual tax upon the taxable net income of residents and non-residents alike. One of the four
classes taxed is that of "domestic and foreign corporations ... whose business within this State
during the taxable year consists exclusively of foreign commerce, interstate commerce, or both."
(Emphasis added.)
4. 358 U.S. 450, 452 (1959).
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than this in the case before them. In order to more fully understand
the decision of the Court, it is necessary to briefly examine some of
these earlier cases relied upon by the majority for support of its de-
cision.
The decision in Peck & Company v. Lowe5 was said to "point
the way" to the conclusion reached in the Northwestern case. In the
Lowe case the plaintiff was a domestic corporation engaged in buying
goods in several states, shipping them to foreign countries, and there
selling them. A net income tax was levied by the state of incorpora-
tion on plaintiff's net income. The Court held that the tax was not
laid on articles in the course of exportation, which would have been
a violation of article 1, section 9 of the United States Constitution,"
but that it was levied after exportation and, at most, effected expor-
tation only indirectly and remotely. By analogy, therefore, it was
felt that a state tax on net income derived from interstate commerce
was not a tax on interstate commerce itself.
In both United States Glue Company v. Town of Oak Creek7 and
West Publishing Company v. McColgan,8 the taxpayers were corpo-
rations engaged primarily in selling their products in interstate com-
merce. The question presented in the Glue Company case was
whether the general income tax upon the gains and profits of domes-
tic corporations levied by the State of Wisconsin might include in its
computation net income derived from the transactions in interstate
commerce, without contravening the commerce clause of the constitu-
tion.' A somewhat different question was presented in the West
Publishing Company case. There the tax was not imposed by the
state of incorporation as in the Glue Company case, but rather by one
of the states in which interstate sales were made and the question was,
therefore, whether such a state could impose a tax on the net income
derived from these interstate sales. Both of these questions were
affirmatively answered by the Court.
In the Glue Company case the Court distinguished between a di-
rect levy, which placed a burden on interstate commerce, and a charge
by way of net income derived from profits from interstate commerce;
it said that the latter does not have a direct effect on interstate com-
merce, and that such a tax is but a method of distributing the costs of
governmental services. The majority opinion in the Northwestern
case said, in referring to the Glue Company case and other cases
5. 247 U.S. 165 (1918).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 says: "No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
any State."
7. 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
8. 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
9. The taxes which were in controversy here were: (1) on income from sales to customers
outside the state, the goods having been delivered from the taxpayer's factory, and (2) on in-
come from sales to customers outside the state, the sales having been made by, and goods
shipped from, the taxpayer's branches in other states.
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cited,' ° that these cases stand for the doctrine that the entire net in-
come of a corporation derived from interstate, as well as intrastate,
activities may be apportioned among the states for tax purposes by
formuli utilizing intrastate aspects of interstate affairs.
According to the majority opinion in the Northwestern case, any
doubt as to their position was entirely dispelled in the West Publish-
ing Company case, for there it was recognized that income from pure-
ly interstate operations may be taxed. Further, the majority said,
the fact that office space was given West's solicitors by attorneys, in
exchange for use of books that they had on hand for their sales ac-
tivities, was a mere triviality, and this decision was not based upon
such trivial detail.
In their dissenting opinions, Mr. Justice, Whittaker and Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter refuted the contention that the cases relied upon by
the Court supported its holding. They felt that in no case prior to
this decision was there a total absence of activities within the taxing
state severable from the process which constitutes interstate com-
merce, as there was in the present case." Therefore, they said this
decision cannot rest upon these earlier cases but must, if upheld, rest
upon a new doctrine. This new ground is the state's power to tax
exclusively interstate commerce, which, the minority felt, was in di-
rect violation of the Constitution and, therefore, could not be upheld.
CONCLUSION
On September 14, 1959, the President signed into law a bill 2 lim-
iting the Supreme Court's ruling in the Northwestern case. The "In-
terstate Income Law," as it is called, limits the states' power to tax
income derived from interstate commerce when only nominal activi-
ties are carried on within the state."3 The passage of this law, how-
ever, has not ended the controversy. One state has already said that
it will contest the new law as being unconstitutional at the earliest op-
10. It should be noted that the statute involved, Deering's Gen. Laws, act 84 94a, § 3, con-
tained this statement: "Income from sources within this State includes income from tangible
or intangible property or having a sims in this State and income from any activities carried on
in this State, regardless of whether carried on in intrastate, interstate or foreign commerce."
(Emphasis added.)
11. An example of the dissents' reasoning is Mr. Justice Whittaker's comment on the West
Publishing Company case, "that the findings established the usual criteria which this court has
consistently held to constitute the doing of intrastate commerce. California determined and
taxed only the amount of that intrastate commerce. It did not tax any interstate commerce."
358 U.S. at 468. (Emphasis added.)
12. Senate 2524, Public Law 86-272, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 14, 1959.
13. The act (Senate 2524) says that no state shall have the power to impose a net income
tax on the income derived within such state from interstate commerce if the only business ac-
tivity within such state is: "(1) the solicitation of orders by such person or his representative,
in such state for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for
approval or rejection and if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point outside
the State...."
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portunity, 14 and others have said that the bill will have no effect on
the administration of its corporate net income taxes. 15 However, at
this date the law remains in effect, and it is, therefore, necessary to
evaluate the Supreme Court's decision in the light of the present law.
Certain things seem clear. First, those states that do not at the
present time have corporate income taxes16 will not want to be left
behind; consequently they will probably enact appropriate legislation
at the earliest possible time. Second, those states which already have
such a tax - there are thirty such states - will change their tax pro-
visions to fit the present situation. This will mean that instead of
placing a tax on corporations "engaging in business," they will place
a tax on all corporations deriving any income from sources within the
state. And third, virtually all interstate business will be subject to a
properly drawn tax. Such a tax is one that is stated to be based upon
income derived from sources within the state, where there is a "suffi-
cient nexus," or connection, in the state to support the tax. The crux
of the matter then becomes clear: what will constitute a "sufficient
nexus" ?
Certainly, under the new federal law mere solicitation of orders
will not be a "sufficient nexus" to allow the state to impose an income
tax on corporations engaged in interstate commerce; some further
activity will be needed. Would the using of office space and the ad-
vertising of those offices as the company's local address, as in the
West Publishing Company case, be enough today? Will maintaining
incidental motor terminals by a trucking company engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce, as in Spector Motor Service, Incorporated v.
O'Connor,17 allow the state to impose a properly drawn tax on the
income derived from this activity? What about advertising alone;
will that be a sufficient connection to impose such a tax?' These
and many similar situations will call for further court determina-
tions.' 9
14. The Collector of Revenue for the State of Louisiana has said that that state will challenge
the constitutionality of this law at the first opportunity. 22 CoRP. J. 283 (1960). Louisiana
is the appropriate state to make such a move, since it was the United States Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in two cases - Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 359
U.S. 28 (1959), and International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 359 U.S. 984 (1959) - which left
in effect decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court that mere merchandising of orders was
enough to make a corporation subject to the state's taxing jurisdiction.
15. The Utah Tax Commission, in commenting on the new federal law (see CCH, Vol. 20,
No. 38, State Tax Review 1 [November 21, 1959]), said that the primary purpose of its new
corporation income tax law was to impose the tax on certain airline companies and telephone
and telegraph companies whose activities are purely interstate in nature, and which companies
all have officers and many employees in the state. Therefore, it felt that the state would not
be prohibited from imposing the tax.
16. Those states which do not have a corporate income tax are: Florida, Ohio, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
17. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
18. It would seem that under the recent Congressional enactment such a tax would be pro-
hibited.
19. Already interesting developments are taking place. The Supreme Court of the United
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